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Moral Foundations and Judgment: Conceptualizing Boundaries 
Consumers regularly encounter moral behavior-related information about firms (e.g. Enron), 
brands (e.g. Tylenol), and individuals (e.g. President Trump). Since morality is considered to 
be a significant foundation for consumers’ self-concepts and a motivating force in society, it 
is deemed an essential factor in shaping attitudes, values, and purchase intentions. Morality 
covers practices and activities considered importantly right and wrong, including the rules 
governing those activities, and the values that are imbedded, fostered, or pursued by their 
practices (DeGeorge 1982). Further, moral behavior relates to, “actions that demonstrate 
social responsiveness to the needs and interest of others,” (Aquino et al., 2009, p 124), or, 
how people are expected to treat others (Turiel, 1983). As such, a behavior is considered 
moral if it conforms to established practices and customs of the relevant group (Weiss, 1942).  
Even though the definitions of morality may seem to provide straightforward criteria 
to assess the morality of individuals, moral judgments are challenging and less exact. First, 
the fashion in which the moral information is delivered to consumers, the type of moral 
incident (e.g. eating certain animals, infidelity, etc.), and individuals’ characteristics 
influencing their processing of the information could impact how consumers comprehend, 
interpret, and act on the information. Second, often, these judgments are based on limited 
information, such that a person is not fully informed about the complete incident (De Groot 
and Steg, 2009). This is compounded by consumers’ biased perceptual system resulting in 
individuals’ tendency to attend more to negative than positive information (Rozin and 
Royzman, 2001), especially when the negative information pertains to morality, compared to 
other negative information (Trump 2014).  
For instance, it is important to note that consumers can and do disallow moral 
violations to inform judgments and decisions. Belk et al. (2006) found that consumers 
experience a lack of concern for a firm’s moral violations and this affects subsequent product 
page 2 
 
choice, particularly when concerned with the environment, labor conditions, or counterfeits. 
Perhaps this explains why consumers criticize firms for their treatment of employees and 
business partners (e.g. Wal-Mart), yet, these businesses remain frequented by and loved by 
consumers. Anecdotes provide evidence of instances that cannot be explained by referring to 
principles of morality. As an example, one salient attribute of Tiger Woods is his 
philandering. Though some individuals dislike him, and his scandal cost shareholders 
approximately $10 billion, some others moved past the incident and regard him highly 
(Knittel and Stango, 2010). Likewise, Bill Clinton won two terms in office despite infidelity.  
These inconsistencies and complexities beg the question of how individuals construe 
different meaning from moral information. Importantly, these instances highlight the need to 
further study morality and moral judgment, specifically identifying factors that interact and 
influence the relationship between consumer’s moral judgment and related attitudes and 
behavioral outcomes (Shalvi et al., 2012). Such an approach helps answer questions such as 
“what are the boundary conditions for moral judgments?” “are there particular consumers 
which attend more to moral information, and thus, are more likely to punish offending 
entities?” and “why do moral violations not always result in negative outcomes?”  
Noting that morality issues may differ across cultures and even within a culture, and 
some consumers can flexibly view a moral issue, such that moral judgments can be malleable, 
the present research aims to advance the streams of research on morality and moral judgment 
by providing a conceptualization of boundary conditions in the relationship between moral 
judgments and consumer behavior. More specifically, the research identifies cultural, 
individual, and situational factors that influence moral judgments and decision making and 
argues that 1) moral judgments exhibit a similar pattern across types but 2) cultural factors 
determine the salience of each moral foundation type, 3) while construal factors relevant to 
the situation (i.e. proximity vs. distance) affect the extent and manner of moral judgment, and 
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4) individual mindsets and their associated information processing styles (e.g. money vs. time 
orientation and promotion vs. prevention orientation) can make moral judgments more 
malleable, adding a degree of variability to judgments within similar cultures and situations. 
Morality and Society 
Four features distinguish a moral situation from other social situations namely, 1) high 
importance of the situation, 2) its intentionality (i.e. accidentally violating a norm is not 
immoral), 3) the inability to change the moral rules to exempt penalty, and 4) a felt pressure to 
conform to the norms (Hart, 1961). As a society experiences specific instances where all 
criteria have been met, according to Walzer (1983), the morality of a community is gradually 
built up and acquired, and thus, related to its customs, what the society or group accepts as 
being the right or wrong way to act, as well as its laws, which add legal prohibitions and 
sanctions to many activities considered to be immoral (DeGeorge, 1982, p. 13).  
Generally, individuals act in a manner that follows social customs and laws. Deviation 
from societal custom and laws, though, can be explained by the Norm Activation Model 
(NAM; Schwartz, 1977), which includes three variables related to moral behaviors. The first 
moral variable, personal norms (PN), is defined as the feeling of “moral obligation to perform 
or refrain from specific actions” (Schwartz and Howard, 1981, p. 191). The second variable 
relates more to the sanctions and penalties of acting immorally, awareness of consequences 
(AC), defined as awareness of the negative consequences for others or for other things one 
values when not acting morally. The third variable is ascription of responsibility (AR), related 
to the feeling of responsibility for the negative consequences such that low AR means that 
individuals do not feel culpable when their immoral actions led to negative consequences.  
According to De Groot and Steg (2009), awareness of the consequences of the 
behavior is needed for individuals to feel sufficiently responsible for engagement in moral or 
immoral behavior. In other words, only when AC is high do individuals experience high AR. 
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In turn, responsibility feelings (i.e. AR) increase feelings of moral obligation to act in a 
certain way (i.e. PN), and these feelings of obligation induce moral behavioral intentions. For 
example, a negative celebrity incident may lead consumers to evaluate the incident’s impact 
on societal norms in association with how much blame the celebrity deserves (White et al., 
2009). This is further corroborated by studies arguing that awareness of consequences affects 
ascription of responsibility, and responsibility indirectly affects intentions and behavior via 
personal norms (Steg et al., 2005).  
Relatedly, some evidence exists indicating that the average consumer believes the 
government to be responsible (low AR) for discouraging immoral actions (e.g., discouraging 
unethical products and brands), and thus, ethical information and even moral appeals do not 
influence consumer decision making (Belk et al., 2005). In these instances, felt consequences 
(AC) are low, which rationalize individuals to feel low PN toward moral actions (Zhou and 
Whitla, 2013). Specifically, research shows that those who live in social democracies (e.g. 
Sweden, Germany, Spain), believe that since their societies ensure ethical/moral behavior and 
make individual responsibility low, then the citizens do not need to be concerned (Eckhardt et 
al., 2009). This is troubling, as citizens may decide to outsource moral judgments to 
regulatory agencies. After all, moral behavior relates to, “actions that demonstrate social 
responsiveness to the needs and interest of others,” (Aquino et al., 2009, p 124). In other 
words, given that morality incorporates social dimensions and cannot be viewed as an 
individual function, morals were designed to promote group wellbeing (Moore and Gino, 
2013), promoting harmony and diminishing selfishness (Haidt, 2008). 
Morality and social norms are important components in guiding society, promoting 
social welfare, and achieving economic development. As Goodin (2010) argues, conventional 
morality (encouraging trust, honesty and punctuality in economic transactions) generally 
results in individuals behaving morally. Moreover, cultures with strong social norms enforced 
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by the group (i.e. norms shared and accepted by all members of society) and high in 
conventional morality reduce the need for legal enforcement and decrease the cost of 
bargaining and monitoring (Karayiannis and Hatzis, 2012) because morality underscores 
consumption (Devas, 1899) and thereby consumer judgments and decision making (Nielsen 
and McGregor, 2013). For instance, moral beliefs affect prosocial behaviors such as 
volunteering, donating blood, and helping in emergency situations (De Groot and Steg, 2009).  
Given that research ascertains morality as stable within societies, it is necessary to, 
first, establish a framework for understanding existing moral foundations in order to 
understand the extent to which individuals consider morality as malleable. The approaches to 
study morality and its evolution are reviewed in order to comprehensively examine morality 
and make subsequent propositions. 
 
Approaches to study morality 
Considering the interdisciplinary nature of the concept of morality, it has been studied by 
researchers in several fields including legal studies, ethics, sociology, psychology, education, 
and marketing following different perspectives (Cornwell and Higgins, 2015, 2017; Gino and 
Mogilner, 2013; Napier and Luguri, 2013; etc.). The evolutionary biosocial perspective to 
study morality has focused on certain emotions, such as empathy, altruism, guilt, and shame, 
and how they influence moral decisions. Other, researchers, instead, have taken a 
developmental perspective, studying an infant’s acquisition of prosocial behavior or an 
individual’s attempts to make sense of social experiences over time. Haidt and colleagues 
attempted to reconcile both approaches.  
Within the marketing domain, research generally examines moral decision making 
under specific instances, such as evaluating how consumers approach a decision to an 
immoral marketplace offering (i.e. firm, brand, or person; e.g. Trump, 2014; etc.). 
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Particularly, the consumer moral decision making and judgment research focuses on 
investigating either specific factors (variables, such as individual differences) related to moral 
actions or a broader assessment involving general moral beliefs such as how values differ 
across cultures (e.g., Moore and Kim, 2003). In the former stream, research integrates both an 
evolutionary biosocial approach, considering emotions and individual motivations (e.g. 
regulatory focus, rationalizing strategies, as well as the role of evolutionary agency (i.e. age of 
acquiring prosocial orientation and personal beliefs (e.g. political orientation; Corwnwell and 
Higgins, 2017; Iyer et al., 2012). The present research combines both approaches to examine 
specific variables (individual, situational, and cultural) as boundary conditions given a 
broader assessment of culture in general that interplay with moral judgments and decisions in 
an effort to shed more light on how consumers respond to moral violations. The next section 
examines the development of moral foundations in the literature and discusses how culture in 
general underpins each moral foundation.  
 
Moral Foundations Theory 
Several groups of researchers have aimed to arrive at a set of moral foundations that guide 
decision-making, and thus consumer behavior. Shweder et al. (1997) claimed a ‘big three’ 
theory of morality, where individuals subscribed to values based on ethics of autonomy (i.e. 
freedom to pursue happiness without infringing upon others such as that espoused by 
democratic governments), community (i.e. desire to act in order to sustain group 
membership), and divinity (i.e. following divine laws such as purity). While values of 
autonomy exist across all types of cultures, community and divinity possess variable 
importance across cultures (Haidt et al., 1993; Shweder et al., 1997). In deciphering 
differences in cultures, Schwartz (1992) deviated from morals specifically, arriving at an 
inventory of values. 
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In particular, Schwartz and Boehnke (2014), speculated that individuals pursue several 
values, examining values in over 60 countries. Their results identified five of which that are 
morality-centric: universalism (i.e. unity, justice, and fairness), benevolence (i.e. kindness and 
helpfulness), conformity (i.e. obedience to authority, politeness), tradition (i.e. accept group 
norms, religious tradition), and security (i.e. loyalty and keeping social order), with others 
non-central to morality, such as power and achievement. According to Helkama (2004), three 
or four values (e.g. universalism, benevolence, and conformity/tradition) are the most 
important moral values as they serve important roles in every culture, consistent with 
evolutionary theories on the role of cooperation for social cohesion (Krebs, 2008) and parallel 
Shweder et al.’s (1997) concepts of autonomy and community. In other words, these values 
do not vary by country, but are universal, accepted by all cultures (Vauclair and Fischer, 
2011).  
Graham and colleagues (Graham et al., 2009) assimilated the works of Shweder et al. 
(1997), Schwartz’s (1992) values, the ethic of justice, and the ethic of autonomy arriving at 
two major moral foundations: individualizing and binding. Whereas individualizing 
foundations protecting individuals’ freedoms and rights, binding foundations correspond to 
relations with others and groups, such as social norms and community life. Like the autonomy 
ethic, individualizing foundations guide all cultures equally (Graham et al., 2009). To further 
explain moral differences across a general cultural scope, Graham et al. (2011) created Moral 
Foundations Theory. Five moral foundations were initially explained to guide all decision-
making, including care (i.e. benevolence), fairness (i.e. justice, proportional equality, 
universalism), loyalty (i.e. patriotism, safety, self-sacrifice), authority (i.e. respect for 
tradition, obedience to a hierarchy), and purity (i.e. sanctity from degradation, religious 
traditions). Iyer et al. (2012) then added a sixth foundation, liberty (i.e. reacting against 
oppression and domination).  
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Furthering the work on Moral Foundations theory, Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009) 
proposed that all foundations can be both prescriptive (i.e. what one should engage in) or 
proscriptive (i.e. what one should avoid, condemn), with past research situating care, loyalty, 
and purity as mostly prescriptive. Moreover, authority has not received much attention from 
research, and freedom values have yet to be considered (Loureiro et al., 2016). Table 1 builds 
upon on the work of Loureiro et al. (2016) and Iyer et al. (2012) by adding prescriptive and 
proscriptive features of the freedom foundation and outlines the relationships amongst these 
moral norms, the terms used, as well as universality of the foundation.  
Insert Table 1 Here 
The next section demonstrates how cultures may respond differently to the moral 
foundations. The section also identifies individual and situational factors that influence moral 
judgments and consumer responses. 
 
Cultural Values and Morality Judgment 
According to terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1989), negative reactions to moral 
transgressors occur because such deviance implicitly threatens the validity of one's own 
beliefs and values and the cultural conception of reality from which they are derived. Thus, in 
the case of a moral foundation violation, it is implied either that the moral may not be valid or 
that the violator is evil. Rather than considering the moral principle invalid, people prefer to 
view the violator as evil. Thus, societies tend to punish those who break norms. Following 
these arguments, Greenberg et al. (1989) found that when mortality is made salient, 
individuals respond positively toward those who uphold cultural values and negatively toward 
those who violate cultural values. More specifically, moral principles facilitate individuals’ 
efforts to conceive of themselves as valued contributors to the culture. Thus: 
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P0: The salience of moral principles and values in a culture influences individual 
reactions to immorality. 
 
Individualism vs. Collectivism  
It is important to differentiate collectivistic and individualistic societies, which differ 
in their emphasis on moral foundations, as defined by emphasizing duties versus rights and 
individuals versus groups. Duty-based cultures, reflective of how individuals conducts 
themselves in relation to others (Chiu et al., 1997), exhibit stricture adherence to moral values 
as they are explicit and expected to be followed. Collectivist cultures tend to value duties over 
rights so they place high value on both individualizing and binding values (Vauclair et al., 
2014), including community and divinity ethics (Haidt et al., 1993; Shweder et al., 1997).  
As justice and freedom are linked to democracies (Haidt and Graham, 2009), 
individualistic culture (e.g. France, Great Britain, etc.) value rights over duties (Chiu et al., 
1997; Vauclair et al., 2014) and place higher values on individualizing moral foundations. 
Specifically, rights-based cultures, are less likely to experience the same strong adherence to 
social norms, and because the duties to adhere to are not directly expressed, these cultures 
value individualizing norms more, with an exception of authority (Graham et al., 2011). 
Likewise, since individuals are likely to pursue ends disagreeable to a society but not harmful 
to anyone, Vauclair and Fischer (2011) find that some binding foundations, such as purity, 
may be violated without negative judgment. Thus, collectivist cultures tend to value all moral 
foundations while individualistic cultures value individualizing foundations over binding 
foundations. In sum, both cultures value individualizing morals because of the universal rules 
associated with cooperation (Richerson and Boyd, 2005) and emphasis on personal norms 
(Schwartz and Howard, 1981).  
P1: The strength of individuals’ judgments of individualizing vs. binding moral 
violations depend on the degree of individualism vs. collectivism of their culture. 
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As cultural values tend to shift, it is noteworthy that several collectivist societies have 
become more individualistic. Especially with the rise of the younger populations, 
individualistic tendencies have developed in several societies traditionally associated with 
collectivism, such as Asian societies (Hamamura, 2011). Therefore, going forward, research 
should explore how younger generations within collectivist societies view individualizing 
versus binding foundations, and how this affects society overall. Formally: 
P2: Younger generations in traditionally collectivist countries are concerned less 
about binding foundations and more about individualizing foundations. 
 
Cultural Religiosity 
Societies also differ by their religiosity and spirituality, both of which regard morality 
the same (Zinnbauer and Pargament, 2005). For instance, the United States has a strong 
evangelical community compared to France, a politically Catholic society, but very secular in 
practice (Davis, 2009). This is partially attributed to the role of morality in society, where 
morals may be more or less important in defining social hierarchies (Lamont, 1992). In 
societies high in religion or spirituality, individuals have a greater regard for morality, 
punishing more fervently immorality (Walker and Pitts, 1998). Additionally, religious/ 
spiritual societies value all moral values (Vauclair and Fischer, 2011), are less likely violate 
proscriptive behaviors, and more likely engage in prescriptive moral actions (Rodriguez-Rad 
and Hidalgo, 2018). However, as younger generations become less spiritual/ religious, 
changing the culture, it is anticipated that their adherence to these norms will decline. Thus: 
P3: The strength of individuals’ judgments of proscriptive vs. prescriptive moral 
violations depend on the degree of religiosity of their culture. 
P4: Younger generations in traditionally religious or spiritual countries are less 
concerned about moral foundations, especially purity. 
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Situational Factors and Morality Judgment  
Beyond viewing culture as a lens to evaluate moral judgment, situations can influence how 
groups and individuals in a society may reorient their views in regards to a moral violation. 
For instance, not all situations involve one decision, such as whether or not to lie to the group. 
Instead, lying might be beneficial as long as it spares others’ feelings or is done for the greater 
good. In these cases, culture alone cannot explain moral judgment and decision making. For 
this, construal level theory can be used. 
 
Construal Level  
Construal level theory approaches all situations in terms of proximity (spatially, 
psychologically, and temporally) and suggests that when a situation is far, individuals prefer 
abstract construal, such as the big picture. However, when a situation is more proximal, they 
prefer to use concrete construal for evaluations, such as details and specific information 
(Trope and Liberman, 2003). While the preference for abstract versus concrete thoughts 
varies by culture (Haidt et al., 1993), a situational construal level approach to morality can 
further explain why some individuals or groups do not negatively judge immorality. 
As such, while concrete thinking involves affect and the details of the violation, 
abstract thinking is more cognitive and concerned with the universal norms (Nichols and 
Knobe, 2008) and why an individual behaves immorally (Eyal et al., 2008). This would 
explain why individuals, would generally judge a moral violation negatively but rationalize 
immorality if a universal moral violation was adhered to (i.e. to achieve the common good, 
sometimes it is ok to break a minor moral foundation). Even though abstract thoughts lead to 
more negative judgments following a moral violation (Napier and Luguri, 2013), there may be 
reason to believe that this is not always the case.   
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For one, abstract construal tends to focus on individualizing over binding foundations. 
Napier and Luguri (2013) suggest that violations of binding foundations may be judged more 
individually and contextually. Such is the case when individuals tend to share the same values 
(Kivetz and Tyler, 2007). It is proposed that when construing events in an abstract manner, 
moral foundations are seen in a hierarchy (see Figure 1). Universal, individualizing 
foundations (i.e. bottom level moral foundations) will be more critical to the group and will 
take precedent over other foundations. The universal, binding foundations are at the second 
level. Finally, purity and authority are at the third level. In other words, lower foundations 
will be more critical to the group, such that their violations will be more negatively judged.  
P5: Individuals who hold an abstract (vs. concrete) construal will more negatively 
judge a moral violation, especially those lower in the hierarchy. 
P6: When the behavior violates a moral foundation higher in the hierarchy in 
favor of a moral behavior consistent with a moral foundation in a lower hierarchy, 
having an abstract construal will result in less negative judgments.   
Insert Figure 1 here. 
Moreover, it is possible to predict how an individual may construe a situation, 
determining consumer judgment. Given that an abstract construal results in harsher judgments 
when evaluated with less (vs. greater) proximity (Kim et al., 2008), an abstract construal 
makes moral foundations more salient (Trope and Liberman, 2003). For instance, an abstract 
construal resulted in less negative judgment when evaluating the action in the present versus 
the future (Eyal et al., 2008) or past (Kyung et al., 2010). Proximity makes a moral violation 
less negative since it is viewed as a specific action (e.g. having an affair) versus as a breach to 
a moral foundation (e.g. trust and purity foundations) (Eyal et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
an individual that likes, personally knows, or evaluates a moral situation in the present will 
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most likely use concrete criteria for evaluating a moral situation, and will judge a violator less 
negatively (Chung and Park, 2013).  
When viewing a violation concretely, individuals tend to consider details (Kim et al., 
2008; Nichols and Knobe, 2008), which might include responsibility of the violator, including 
whether other individuals could share blame. Given that personal norms are more abstract 
(Kivetz and Tyler, 2007), abstract thinking focuses on why (Eyal et al., 2008), and the 
situation is diagnostic (Nussbaum et al., 2003), it is predicted that abstract thoughts focus less 
on attributions of responsibility and more on the consequences, instead of whether the action 
was simply morally right or wrong. Formally: 
P7: Abstract construal of a moral violation will result in less negative judgments 
when proximal. This is explained through diagnosticity of social norms. 
P8: In an abstract construal, awareness of consequences plays a stronger role in 
moral judgment compared to ascription of responsibility.  
 
Individual Factors and Moral Judgment 
The aforementioned propositions can shed more light on why individuals value moral 
foundations and their beliefs do not always align with their actions (e.g. Eckhardt et al., 
2009). In addition to the situation pertaining to the type of moral foundation violated, and how 
this situation affects the ascription of responsibility, awareness of consequences, and social 
norms, an individual’s motivations should alter how he or she judges a moral violation. A 
discussion of this follows. 
 
Individual Trait Malleability 
While rationalizing enables individuals to justify positive feelings despite immoral 
actions, moral decoupling involves a psychological separation process of dissociation of 
page 14 
 
immoral behavior from consequences (Bhattacharjee et al., 2013). A cognitive process, moral 
decoupling suggests some individuals can cognitively (rather than emotionally) evaluate 
immorality (Lee and Kwak, 2016). While the use of moral decoupling varies, some 
individuals may be able to use more cognitive strategies assessing awareness of 
consequences, ascription of responsibility, and social norms (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 
2001). Consistent with these ideas, Tiger Woods’ supporters publicly admonished his private 
affairs while suggesting that his performance on the golf course is a completely different and 
separate aspect of his life (Horrow and Swatek, 2009).  
P9: Individuals’ ability to exercise moral decoupling affects their judgment of 
moral violations. 
As Bhattacharjee et al. (2013) claim, understanding when individuals can engage in 
moral decoupling rather than using intuitive biases or emotions is a promising area for future 
research. This paper furthers this research agenda and discuss certain cases in which moral 
judgments can be more malleable due to moral decoupling. 
 
Individuals’ Regulatory Focus 
 Regulatory focus theory is a goal pursuit theory arguing that individuals with 
promotion versus prevention orientation engage different mental approaches in their judgment 
and decision making (Roy and Phau, 2014), which may be helpful in understanding when to 
use facts versus emotions to change consumer behavior. According to regulatory focus theory, 
a prevention focus has more concerns for safety and security and uses concrete facts since 
their decisions are deliberative and analytical (Forster et al., 2003; Pham and Avnet, 2009). In 
contrast a promotion focus, motivated to accomplish hopes and dreams (Higgins, 1998) relies 
more on feelings, emotions (Cornwell and Higgins, 2017; Pham and Avnet, 2009), intuition, 
and speed in decision making (Forster et al. 2003).  
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These facts provide support that different types of information may influence how 
each orientations influence judgments, such that, referring to the NAM, a prevention-
orientation would be influenced by assessment of consequences and ascription of 
responsibility (Schwartz & Howard, 1981); it is expected that a prevention-focus will less 
negatively judge a moral violator when these factors are lower. The following propositions 
are offered: 
P10: When engaged in a prevention-orientation, individuals who attribute less 
consequences involved in a moral violation and/or less ascription of responsibility to the 
violator will judge the moral violator less negatively.  
P11: When engaged in a promotion-orientation, the consequences and risks of the 
moral violation are less likely to influence judgments of a moral violation.  
Although past research has found that both orientations involve are concerned with 
proscriptive and prescriptive morals (e.g. prevention-orientation involves approaching duties 
and avoiding punishments; promotion implies approach of desirable and avoidance of 
undesirable state) (Cornwell and Higgins, 2015), more research is needed to understand 
morality from a regulatory focus perspective. Specifically, when judging others’ actions, such 
when examining proscriptive (should avoid) or prescriptive (should do or could do) norms 
(Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009), one should account for individual tendencies of the two 
regulatory foci. For instance, prevention-orientation is tied more closely to prescriptive 
morality (i.e. duties and obligations), similar to collective tendencies and interdependent 
preferences (Zhang et al., 2014). Thus, it is predicted that when violating a proscriptive norm, 
those in a prevention-orientation will judge the violator more negatively. And, while 
prescriptive norms may not be as important in the behavior of others, it is expected that 
promotion-orientation would be more negative compared to prevention-orientation. 
Specifically: 
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P12: While proscriptive moral violations are judged more negatively than 
violations of prescriptive morals, having a promotion- (vs. prevention-) orientation will 
result in more (vs. less) negative judgments for violations of prescriptive morals.  
While all moral violations would be equally deplorable for those in a promotion 
orientation, there are some moral foundations that would be esteemed more negatively than 
others. For instance, given that purity (i.e. divinity norms) and binding norms are more related 
to feelings and emotions in relation to others in groups (Graham et al., 2012; Shweder, et al., 
1997) and since promotion (vs. prevention) orientation evaluates based on feelings (vs. facts) 
(Higgins, 1998), it is predicted that violations of binding and divinity norms are more 
negatively judged for individuals when experiencing a promotion- versus prevention-
orientation. Thus:  
P13: A prevention (vs. promotion) orientation results in less negative judgments 
when violating a divinity or binding (vs. individualizing) moral foundation. 
 
Individuals’ Emphasis on Money versus Time 
 According to construal theory, concrete (vs. abstract) thinking involves a stronger 
focus on symbolic rewards such as resources of money and time (Nussbaum et al., 2003). 
However, little is known about how thinking about concrete features of time versus money 
can inform moral judgments. While this trait is culturally derived, such that more 
individualistic cultures tend to think of money more and collectivist cultures tend to value 
time over money), it could be religion-influenced, situationally-dependent (e.g. individuals in 
lower socio-economic positions focus on money over time; Mogilner, 2010), or even 
individually-determined, a malleable trait (Gino and Mogilner, 2013).  
 Specifically, thinking about time triggers an individual to reflect on his or her life 
(Loewenstein, 1999), promotes pursuit of universal ideals (Liu and Aaker, 2007), leads to 
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greater happiness (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009), and encourages personal engagement 
(Mogilner, 2010). However, thinking about money makes an individual more selfish, seeking 
autonomy (Amato and Rogers, 1997; Vohs et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2009) and can prevent 
individuals from feeling mental pain associated with social exclusion (Zhou et al., 2009), 
equivalent to actual physical pain (MacDonald and Leary, 2005; DeWall and Baumeister, 
2006). In other words, when individuals normally feel mental pain, such as sanctions and 
penalizations (e.g. outcast by a group or verbal reprimanding), money thoughts could buffer 
individuals from pain. Similarly, it would be expected that money thoughts focus individuals 
on a task, such as judgment, without raising concern for the pain caused by immorality or its 
judgment. Thus, it is expected that thoughts about money make an individual less likely to 
judge others negatively for immorality.  
Additionally, compared to time, which uses heuristics and emotions for evaluation, 
money-related thoughts use more cognitive processes (Saini and Monga, 2008), leading to 
greater objectivity (Mogilner, 2010). Because cognitive processes are more adept when 
thinking of money, it would be expected that logic would determine judgments as opposed to 
time, which involves feelings and emotions (Williams and Drolet, 2005) as opposed to those 
who think about time (i.e. considering social norms and concern for others) where groups are 
more personally relevant (Mogilner, 2010). Even though money- (vs. time) related thinking is 
hypothesized to result in less negative judgments, it is estimated that judgments will be more 
negative if there are greater consequences and responsibility when in a money mindset. 
Specifically:  
P14: Having a money (vs. time)-focused mindset results in less negative 
judgments following a violation of a moral foundation. 
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P15: Though a time mindset will not change moral judgment given concrete 
information, a money mindset may lead to greater (vs. less) negative judgment given 
high (vs. low) awareness of consequences and/or ascription of responsibility.  
  
General Discussion and Conclusions  
In summary, despite seemingly straightforward definitions of morality and the abundance of 
criteria to assess morality of individual, organizational, and people brands, moral judgments 
are challenging and less exact, resulting in contrasting reactions and judgments to moral 
violations across and even within cultures. Following a thorough, interdisciplinary review of 
extant literature and building on the precepts of norm activation model and moral foundation 
theory, the present research uniquely brings together literature from consumer research, social 
psychology, ethics, and morality and identifies boundary conditions in the relationship 
between moral judgments and consumer behavior.  
In so doing, the research makes several contributions. First, the paper connects 
different categorizations of moral principles and create a reference point for future research to 
identify prescriptive and proscriptive features of each of the six moral foundations as well as 
their universality or variability across cultures (See Table 1). Second, the research categorizes 
factors influencing individuals’ judgments of moral violations into cultural, situational, and 
individual factors. Such a perspective proves helpful in discussing contradictions regarding 
reactions to moral transgressions of different type among individuals. Third, several 
propositions are presented that can guide future research in the areas of moral judgment and 
consumer behavior. 
More specifically, it is argued that cultural values of individualism vs. collectivism are 
associated with right-based and duty-based characteristics of the culture which impact how 
members of the society respond to individualizing vs. binding moral foundation violations. 
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The propositions suggest that while collectivist cultures value all moral foundations, 
individualistic cultures value individualizing foundations over binding foundations. 
Furthermore, cultural religiosity is identified as another cultural factor influence moral 
judgments. Moreover, the degree of religiosity of cultures should influence the degree of 
reaction to proscriptive vs. prescriptive moral violations. Propositions have also been made 
predicting how changes in cultural values may influence judgments of immorality. 
Furthermore, construal level theory provides the foundation for the influence of 
situational factors on moral judgments. The research proposed groups moral foundations in 
three levels based on their degree of universality from the perspective of construal theory. 
Noting that abstract vs. concrete construal levels result in varying levels of attention to details 
and perceptions of relevance of actions/situations, arguing that different construal levels will 
result in different judgments of moral violations with varying degrees of universality as well 
as the factors influencing judgments (e.g. attribution of responsibility and consequences).  
 Individual factors, such as regulatory focus and money versus time mindset, are also 
discussed to have an effect on moral judgments by influencing individuals’ motivation and 
approach in processing information. From the regulatory focus theory perspective, promotion 
results in less focus on consequences, risks, and details of actions. Such differences influence 
the ability and interest of individuals in focusing on risks of moral violations or personal 
emotional reactions to such violations. Consequently, for prevention-focused individuals, lack 
of risks, negative consequences, or responsibility will result in less negative judgments of 
moral violations. Similarly, a money versus time-focused mindset will result in different 
degrees of attention to social norms versus personal goals which will consequently inform 
individuals’ judgments of moral violations. These are just two individual differences that exist 
within the overall framework. However, future research and conceptual papers should 
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highlight other individual difference variables along both evolutional biosocial and age of 
agency perspectives, detailing if and when morality is malleable.  
 Overall, the present research makes a rather unique contribution to consumer morality 
literature, by identifying and discussing three different groups of factors with the potential to 
impact individuals’ judgments of and reactions to moral foundation violation information. 
The paper has endeavored to provide an inclusive account of how cultural, situational, and 
individual factors interact with various moral foundations to influence consumer judgments. 
Future research can corroborate and extend the proposed relationships following experimental 
and cross-cultural studies.  
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